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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk analysis and risk management are reliant in order to be effective on their ability 
to engage with and communicate to non-specialist audiences, whether these be 
policy-makers asked to turn the advice that they agree with into practice, those 
implementing decisions, or the public, who are often on the receiving end of these.  
 
Accordingly, there needs to be clarity of purpose regarding – and reflected through – 
the language used, the partners engaged, and the proposed ends of any measures 
to be implemented. These elements sit within specific cultural contexts – both 
geographical and historical – and it is essential to account for these in translating 
theory into practice. 
 
This article surveys the discourse used across various examples, including a 
detailed case study. The most significant conclusion is that while data and evidence 
certainly matter for validation – understanding culture remains key to effective risk 
analysis and trustworthy risk management because, on the whole, people look for 
meaning beyond the mere ‘facts’.1 This applies to risks assumed to be narrowly 
technical as much as those with a strong social, cultural and political dimension. 
 
Insufficient risk analysts and safety experts consider or account for the broader, 
contextual and cultural factors that impact their choices, analyses and modes of 
dissemination.2 This creates a divide between those commissioning and conducting 
the research and those to whom it is held to apply and needs to be implemented by, 
which undermines democratic accountability, as well as the possible benefits of, and 
trust in, their enterprise. 
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1 A recent exemplar of this might be the election of Donald Trump as the President of the 
United States of America, where despite his detractors being supported by an army of ‘fact-
checkers’ and voters being alert to his lies (and personality flaws), still he was elected, on 
the basis presumably, of what he appeared to stand for, beyond the immediate evidence. 
2 ‘Human factors’ analysis tends to focus on individual needs and foibles rather than their 
wider societal framing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Risk analysis and risk management have exploded into public prominence in the 
thirty years since the publication of Ulrich Beck’s Risikogesellschaft (1986), and even 
more so following its translation into English (as Risk Society) in 1992 within the 
context of the aftermath of the collapse of the old – Cold War – world order.3 
 
The concept of risk was previously applied mostly in relation to engineering and 
finance, but through Beck’s work it came to assume a new significance with respect 
to social and cultural matters, such as the environment (his initial impetus), as well 
as public health, security and even interpersonal relations. 
 
Journals such as Risk Analysis were reinvigorated and many others were launched 
around this time (e.g. the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (1988) in the US, and the 
Journal of Risk Research (1998) in Europe). Countless new courses, conferences 
and centres focusing on risk also emerged.4 
 
Much of the early discussion was more conceptual in its framing than now. What is a 
risk? Who decides? Are risks objective or socially constructed? To what extent could 
the psychometric paradigm or cultural theory shed any light? How ought we to go 
about mitigating presumed impacts or consequences?5 
 
Inevitably – over time – the emphasis shifted towards measuring social risks and 
public perceptions more carefully as well. So-called ‘human factors’ also became 
more prominent, and a quantitative element emerged in these areas. But with this 
there arrived a number of new problems. As risk analysis has increasingly embraced 
advanced mathematical modelling, to what extent is it still able to speak to the 
audiences it needs to reach – from policy-makers through operational implementers 
to the wider public?  
 
How do these audiences engage with and decipher the often very detailed and 
complex analytical frameworks developed over considerable time-spans by industry 
experts and academics? And – even more challengingly – are those experts 
themselves clear and in agreement as to their aims and purposes, as well as the 
possible consequences of their projections and the resonance of these – or not – 
among those they are held to be advising? 
 
A disconnect with others, and a concomitant ‘culture of suspicion’, is considered to 
be one of the many possible sources of mistrust in a system (O’Neill, 2002). What’s 
more, empirically focused risk analysts may be less versed in the study of social 
forces and the understanding of cultural change than they could be.  
 
                                                          
3 Furedi (2002), for instance, notes a ten-fold increase in reference to the phrase ‘at risk’ in 
British broadsheet newspapers across the latter part of the 1990s. 
4 The Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR) at the London School of 
Economics from 2000, and the King’s Centre for Risk Management (KCRM) at King’s 
College London from 2002, to name just two of the new centres putting on various courses 
and conferences. 
5 See, for instance, Slovic (1987), Adams (1995), Fischhoff (1995) and Renn (1998). 
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The point may not be so much a need to respond to presumed risks as to influence 
how these are perceived of in the first place. This latter is often a moral and political 
task relating to societal values and mental frameworks that those directing or serving 
the public may not have fully considered (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
 
For instance, whilst it is clear that World Health Organization officials did understand 
the possible role and impact of the media and social media on how their messages 
pertaining to 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza were received, it is less evident that 
they understood their own role within this, still less that of the cumulative impact of 
previous health communications and emergencies upon the public imagination at 
that time (Durodié, 2011). 
 
That the first cases emerged in rural Mexico where the challenge of accessing health 
services skewed reporting away from the norm ought also to have been a cause for 
greater circumspection on their part from the start. And, to argue that it was only with 
hindsight that the concerns could be viewed as having been disproportional to the 
actual threat is to miss the extent to which it was cultural framing more than virology 
that shaped and drove the response and ensuing policy. 
 
Accordingly, before embarking on exploring this any further it will help to present a 
few other examples and the dilemmas that arise from them. These are not held to be 
typical necessarily but rather serve as vignettes offering a lacuna into some of the 
key challenges and processes that ought to concern us. 
 
2. Algebra for real life? 
 
2.1. A very brief example from the UK 
 
On 18 April 2016, some two months prior to the referendum in the United Kingdom to 
consider its continued membership of the European Union (EU), the then Chancellor, 
George Osborne, launched a Treasury analysis document on the purported 
economic impacts, were the UK to leave the EU (HM Government, 2016).  
 
In effect, this was a 200-page quantitative risk analysis of what some forecasters 
expected to occur. Detractors lambasted it as scaremongering and a waste of public 
funds (BBC, 2016a), while the media and other campaigners projected its headline 
prognosis that every household would be £4300 worse off as a consequence of any 
‘Brexit’ vote.6 
 
Leaving aside the politics of the matter, (Durodié, 2016) what is more apposite here 
is to consider the report as just one of the latest exemplars of a growing trend to 
publish weighty tomes to back-up particular views pertaining to public policy on 
socially related risk and to project what ought to be done about these. 
 
Noting the incongruence of such a lengthy and complex work being promoted to 
inform public debate on a decision that was both imminent and important, The 
Telegraph (in many ways the house journal of the British establishment that one 
                                                          
6 Brexit – short for British exit – was the term used for the decision by the UK to leave the 
EU. 
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might have imagined would rally to the Conservative Chancellor’s cause) ran a skit, 
supposedly depicting two men in a pub (to be read as working class as evidenced 
through the portrayal of their Estuarine pronunciation),7 deliberating over the finer 
points of leaving the EU – or not – through reference to the convoluted algebra 
contained in the report: 
 
“Don’t know about you, Baz, but I’m voting to leave. Get immigration down, take 
back our country, and stop this lot in Brussels pushing us around.” 
 
“Come off it, Dave. Be realistic. What about ln(Tijt)?” 
 
 “ln(Tijt)?” 
 
“Yeah, ln(Tijt).” 
 
“What’s ln(Tijt)?” 
 
“Well, it’s equal to α ij + γ t + α₁ ln(Y it  * Y jt ) + α₂ ln(POP it  * POP jt ) + ε ijt .” 
 
“God, that’s a point. I’d never looked at it like that before.” 
 
“See, it all makes sense when you think about it.” 
 
“Fair enough, got me bang to rights there. And there was me thinking 3 x (Tijt) 
= α it ₁ * Y jt  + (X * Y it ) + 2X it ₃ - ε ijt .” 
 
“Jesus, Dave, where do you get this rubbish? You’ve got to stop reading the 
Daily Star.” 
 
As the part-Irish comedian Paul Merton noted wryly on the satirical BBC television 
show Have I Got News For You a few days later (BBC, 2016b), ‘the last four letters 
seem to spell eejit’.8 Presumably, in his mind at least, the real ‘eejit’s here were 
those who had prepared the over-detailed 201 page forecast in the first place. 
 
2.2. A longer example from the Netherlands with consideration of wider implications 
 
In 2007, the Dutch government developed a new National Security Strategy informed 
by a detailed National Risk Assessment (MIBZK, 2007), the methodology for which 
was published the following year. This latter coincided with the production in the UK 
of the first National Risk Register (Cabinet Office, 2008) and, as Vlek has noted 
(2013), other countries soon followed suit, including Australia, Canada, Germany, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. By 2014, the 
process had reached its sixth iteration in the Netherlands alone, engaging a 
significant number of experts in its preparation (RIVM, 2014). 
 
Unlike earlier risk assessments there that had been driven primarily by 
environmental protection policy, this document was designed to address as wide a 
range of risks as could be conceived of. Of course, these included flooding (about 
                                                          
7 Emanating from the Thames Estuary around London and most evidently revealed here by 
the phrase ‘bang to rights’ (meaning caught red-handed and ‘banged-up’ i.e. put in prison). 
8 Eejit – close enough to the recurrent ε ijt term in the formulae – is Gaelic slang for ‘idiot’. 
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half of the land mass of the Netherlands is less than one metre above sea level), but 
also other emerging issues with a more social dimension at that time, such as 
terrorism and pandemics, as well as the assumed impact of the far-right in domestic 
politics, industrial accidents and social unrest. (What it failed to anticipate utterly 
though was the worldwide economic crash the following year). 
 
Irrespective, the Method Guide accompanying the assessment is highly instructive in 
terms of outlooks and approaches both then (MIBZK, 2008), and now in its latest 
form (MVJ, 2014). A review of the first of these prepared in 2008 for the National 
Security Coordination Secretariat in Singapore identified a wide range of issues 
arising from it (Durodié, 2008b), four of which will be discussed further here. These 
are: (1) what is meant by strategy, (2) the challenge of quantifying qualitative indices, 
(3) who the actual decision-makers are, and (4) the use of worst-case scenarios. 
 
2.2.1. Strategy9 
 
Strategy is a much misunderstood and misused term. It is often assumed to be what 
those at the top do, as opposed to the operational matters that ordinary people are 
assumed to be more preoccupied with. But the actions of those on the ground can 
be strategic while our leaders may also focus on matters of little strategic bearing or 
consequence. 
 
Strategy may be high-level, but it need not come from on-high. It is often developed 
through discourse and engagement with a wide group of people. This requires, first 
and foremost clarity over shared interests and purposes. And, as the world is in flux 
and new pressures inevitably arise, strategic development is an on-going process 
that necessitates continuous articulation and re-articulation. 
 
Through establishing a common understanding of situations and encouraging 
identification with agreed objectives, strategy can provide a conceptual framework to 
guide action. It can allow us to anticipate what is expected in the absence of specific 
instruction.10 So while information certainly matters in decision-making, it is often the 
interpretation of that information – through largely predetermined strategic outlooks, 
analyses, understandings or purposes – that indicates how to act. 
 
Most significant here is the need to be clear and coherent as to one’s own goals and 
intended direction in the first place. Surprisingly maybe, this is often lacking in many 
institutions nowadays, including some with important remits and responsibilities.11 
Accordingly, difficulties are often conceived of as emanating from exogenous factors 
when in fact they stem from internal incoherence – or an absence of agreement over 
strategic objectives. 
 
                                                          
9 In addition to Durodié, B. (2008b) referred to above, elements of this section and section 
3.1 also derive from Durodié, B. (2008a). Strategic Information Management, a report for the 
National Security Coordination Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, 30 October 
10 For instance, an official working when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom could assume without having to ask that they should work towards privatising 
public assets (though note the caveats at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/458626.stm). 
11 This may explain the preponderance of policy U-turns. See, for instance: 
https://www.ft.com/content/d476b856-16bb-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d). 
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Strategic thinking must consider the actions and reactions of external forces. But it 
should not be driven by these. Strategy ought to be about setting the agenda, on 
your terms, not simply responding to elements beyond your immediate control. The 
latter can lead to compromising aims, confusing cause and effect, and becoming 
shaped by self-fulfilling prophecies (Merton, 1948), rather than establishing one’s 
own ends and trajectory (Freedman, 2005). 
 
Avoiding debate, or assuming one’s values and direction to be obvious, can be 
concealed by a surfeit of activity that appears to project a sense of purpose and 
determination. In fact, this allows strategic priorities to be lost sight of entirely. 
Focusing on vulnerabilities or unknowns elides capabilities and knowledge. In 
addition, a society that is confident about what it stands for – rather than merely 
knowing what it is against – is far better equipped to deal with adversity than 
otherwise. 
 
Preparing for emergencies and handling risks then are undoubtedly strategic 
priorities, but the ability to do so depends on more than just technical capabilities. It 
is easy to forget one’s broader aims and ambitions. But it is these – especially during 
a crisis – that truly hold people together as those: ‘who believe in a cause or project 
are far more effective agents of it than those who are coerced or corralled’ (Durodié, 
2009b).  
 
Strategy should remind us of where we are going, not just narrow our gaze to the 
challenges we face now. And strategic direction is established well in advance of any 
specific situation emerging. Communicating effectively at such times is dependent on 
the shared sense of purpose and meaning already created by then. The point 
pertaining to the interpretation of H1N1 from a particular (negative) worldview that 
was mentioned earlier is particularly apposite in this regards. 
 
But from the opening summary of the Method Guide to the first Dutch National Risk 
Assessment we are advised that the ‘allocation of capabilities in the strategic 
planning phase is based’ (emphasis added) on the risks identified through the risk 
assessment (p.5). This risk assessment, in its turn, is developed from a process of 
listing and analysing risks that lead to the formulation of various scenarios.  
 
Hence, it is clear that strategic priorities regarding resource allocation are held to 
derive from the identification and assessment of risks which – in keeping with the 
outline presented above – is not really strategic planning but rather an admission 
that priorities may come to be buffeted around by circumstance. 
 
What’s more, and as is often the case in forecasting, the scenarios are little more 
than the extrapolation of contemporary concerns – terrorism, pandemics, climate 
change, utility supply failures, and so on. (It is rare for the real events that shape 
world history – women’s emancipation, the silicon chip, the end of the Cold War, 
market failure etc. – to be within the conceptual horizons of planners. Yet, real 
leadership – which presumably ought to shape strategic planning – requires 
engaging rather more with these possible elements). 
 
Further, as Professor Michael Clarke (the former director of the Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in Whitehall, London) noted, in 
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relation to the decision by the British government and others to participate in the 
conflict in Libya in 2011, key decisions readily by-pass any National Security 
Strategy process and need not be anticipated by it (p.7, Clarke, 2012). 
 
As with much foresight or futurology, the Dutch strategy document was a projection 
of the present rather than looking to purposefully engage and positively nurture 
emerging trends. Accordingly, some of the concerns expressed e.g. ‘annoying or 
threatening tourists’ (p.29) may have been little more than petty prejudices. Others, 
more in tune with the times, such as the fear of ‘fatwa’s (p.29) or ‘statements by 
Dutch people in the Dutch media that are regarded by groups as (extremely) 
inflammatory’ (p.28) (just a few years after the Danish cartoons controversy),12 
raised difficult issues such as who decides, how many need to be offended, what 
level of threat is required to prompt action, in what form and on what scale? 
 
The examples of fatality causing episodes in the document revolve around the exotic 
and the extreme, rather than the mundane and the mainstream. Hence, accidents at 
chemical plants, dyke failures, terrorist attacks, epidemics and riots were examined, 
but not road accident fatalities or other workplace incidents (which are often greater 
in number). In addition, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as ‘fear and 
anger’ (p.37) were simply assumed without any mention of such categories and 
concepts being contextual and contested in the medical, psychiatric and sociological 
literature (Furedi, 2003). 
 
The list continued through common environmental concerns (with little reference to 
the difficulties involved in assessing or auditing these), through social stability, and a 
then relatively novel focus on behaviour modification (‘takes unwise decisions about 
their own health’ (p.37)).13 The possibility that this latter – leading effectively to the 
micro-management of everyday life – may represent a problem of its own further 
afield (as governments shrink back from grand visions for the future to much more 
limited objectives) was not entertained (Durodié, 2017). 
 
But the categories we use and prioritise at any particular time reflect, in part, the 
mood of society. Accordingly, they are, to some extent at least, social constructs. 
And these may drive the pursuit of the very phenomena they purport to explain. So, 
for instance, an emphasis on vulnerability and risk may end up encouraging people 
to feel neglected and injured. 
 
Rather than monitoring what the public supposedly thinks through endless surveys 
and data gathering it may be that a more pro-active approach by government to 
shape this – for instance by emphasising our inherent strengths or strategic 
objectives – could counter a sense of cultural pessimism in what some have come to 
describe as an uncertain (Furedi, 2003), or dystopian age (Demerjian, 2016). 
 
                                                          
12 The publication, in September 2005, of 12 cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in the 
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten and the ensuing worldwide protests in early 2006 (that 
led to their republication through other media). 
13 This has now become quite mainstream as evidenced, for instance, by the work of Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008). 
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2.2.2. Quantifying qualities14 
 
As previously noted, risk analysis has come of age over the last twenty or so years. 
Risk assessors, risk managers and risk communicators now play a central role at the 
heart of many organizations. Senior Risk Officers – a title unheard of until recently – 
now sit on, or advise, the Board of large corporations and public sector institutions. 
 
The growing use of the language of risk and our increasingly organising around it 
require critical analysis. Does society face more risks today than ever before? Is it 
that the risks we face are of a different type (Beck, 1992), or evolving faster 
(Giddens, 1999), than previously? Have we somehow become more conscious of 
risks? Or are we now organising around risks more explicitly? If so, why?  
 
In addition, there is an inherent contradiction built in to most mainstream analyses of 
risk, as the concept itself (in its everyday usage) attempts to reconcile elements that 
are incommensurable.15 Risk is often held to represent the likelihood of a specified 
outcome.16 This has two core aspects – chance and consequence (the first of which, 
in its turn, depends on a conscious choice or a natural cause). Hence we distinguish 
the intrinsic probability of a dice landing on a six from risking it all on throwing a six – 
a decision with an impact. 
 
We should note that the impact is not necessarily a problem. It is good if you win – 
nothing ventured, nothing gained – and bad if you lose – better safe than sorry – but 
presumably, the bank (or the undertaker) could view these results from the opposite 
perspective. Events happen. It is people who determine their moral worth. So risk is 
an opportunity as much as a difficulty, although in recent times it appears to have 
become conceptualised primarily as the latter (which itself is a consequence of 
cultural trends we need to be alert to). 
 
When quantifying risk, the element of human will (or choice) is often ignored and the 
focus is primarily on just two factors – the type of outcome, often described as a 
hazard, impact or consequence – and the scale of it, usually given as a probability, 
likelihood or exposure.17 This is most commonly found expressed as: 
 
RISK = PROBABILITY x IMPACT  
(Or some other variation such as: Likelihood x Consequence, or: Exposure x 
Hazard)18 
 
In some related fields, such as safety and security, risk is sometimes thought of as 
representing the confluence of other concepts – commonly; threat, vulnerability and 
                                                          
14 Elements of this section derive from Durodié, B. (2009a). Inherent Problems of Risk 
Assessment Methodologies, unpublished notes prepared for students of the S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
15 Although Aven and Renn (2009), suggest a definition where this need not be so. 
16 A glossary of alternative definitions is provided by the SRA at: 
http://www.sra.org/sites/default/files/pdf/SRA-glossary-approved22june2015-x.pdf  
17 Introducing ‘human factors’ as they have come to be known, complicates this, but still 
requires identifying the factors and assessing their magnitudes. 
18 No suggestion is made here for these definitions to be equivalent. 
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consequence.19 Risk is then conceived of as being the arena where these three 
overlap. It is a function of these distinct (though not necessarily independent) 
variables: 
 
RISK = f (THREAT * VULNERABILITY * CONSEQUENCE) 
 
All three are held to be necessary for a risk to exist, although quite how the elements 
are to be combined is far from evident. And, of course, other factors may sometimes 
be considered to be important too and can be brought in to the analysis – such as; 
intent, capability and countermeasures. 
 
But, regardless of the number of elements, it is evident that each is to be considered 
both in qualitative and quantitative terms. We are concerned both by the type of 
threat, as well as the magnitude of it (or the activity and its severity as others would 
have it). Similarly with the other factors identified, no matter which or how many. 
 
Hence, irrespective of whether we prefer using the equation; Probability x Impact, 
the representation; f(Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence), or another formulation, 
what is clear is that the concept of risk usually attempts to combine a supposedly 
objective value (likelihood or magnitude), with an evidently more subjective one 
(impact or type).20 
 
This raises an inherent difficulty. That is, that in assessing risk, even in the ideal 
case (without concerning ourselves with the interdependency of variables or 
compensatory behaviour), we are always attempting to combine a quantitative 
measure with a qualitative one.21 (When including ‘human factors’ there is the added 
complication of how we are to value – quantitatively – human values – that are 
qualitative). 
 
Even assuming that we have sufficient data to determine the former (and leaving 
aside the selection of which risks we choose to analyse and the influence of 
unaccounted for – or confounding – variables), there are significant challenges in 
quantifying the qualitative factors to combine the two elements and express a risk 
with a view to enabling social prioritisation. 
 
Typically, it is necessary to assign numerical values to such elements, such as when 
the insurance industry determines the value of a life or a limb to compensate for 
fatalities or serious injuries.22 This may be arrived at through the use of historical 
data or by assessing how much people are willing to pay through premiums or taxes.  
 
But there are many problems associated with this, including how to handle situations 
with insufficient data (uncertainty) or reaching agreement over assigning a worth 
                                                          
19 See, for example, US Department of Homeland Security (2008). 
20 Some, including one of the anonymous reviewers for this article, might propose the latter 
to be more objective and the former less so but, irrespective, the tension and contradiction 
between these remains. 
21 Again, Aven and Renn (2009), may not concur, though that remains to be clarified as 
without any quantification there would be little purpose in assessing, and still less prioritising, 
risks. 
22 Adams (1995), is quite explicit that fatalities are the only data researchers can agree upon. 
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(quantitative) to the things that we deem to be worthy (qualitative). And what effect 
might a sense of control, dread or simply greater awareness have on all these?23 
 
Accordingly, it is quite possible for an individual or institution to assess a situation as 
being say, low-risk, while another may take a very different view based on their 
desire to include some other impact that was not originally accounted for, or to 
weight these differently. All risk assessments then – despite any objective seeming 
representation – are inevitably contestable as well as being contingent.24 And a 
society can come to regard something or some activity as a risk that is not currently 
considered as such.25 
 
This is even worse when disparate perceived threats to national security – such as 
floods, pandemics, social unrest or terrorist attacks – are to be ‘rendered 
comparable’ through ‘unambiguous’ description, ‘backed up by figures’ in order to 
make it ‘possible to prioritise actions’ as proposed in the first Dutch Method Guide 
(p.5). Not only does this conflate risk with uncertainty but it lends itself to generating 
an ever-expanding list of contemporary insecurities which, in the past, would have 
been handled by a range of distinct and dedicated agencies (Environment, Health, 
etc.). 
 
How society responds to a particular problem is contextually and culturally 
determined. There is no fixed response as even identical challenges may be 
addressed differently according to the times (Furedi, 2007a, b and c). One incident 
may galvanise some into action, engendering a sense of community through an 
assertion of values. Another, similar one, may lead to existential angst through 
focusing too much on the threat, or sense of threat (Durodié, 2004). 
 
So not only are different social threats incommensurable in terms of scale and 
substance but so too are equivalent ones in different historical periods. Equating 
these requires attributing appropriate weightings. Inevitably these work towards 
achieving an already provided answer. As any novice will know, the weightings 
determine everything, and when these are compounded and conflated pretty much 
any outcome can be derived. All that is needed is the right equation to prove a 
previously assumed argument. Needless to say, such reverse engineering is a 
profoundly unscientific methodology. 
 
In fact, the Dutch documents avoid the standard risk equation altogether and focus 
instead on developing ‘scenarios’. Likelihood is then described as an ‘expectation’ 
(p.6) or ‘forecast’ (p.20) concerning the occurrence of the scenario. And impact is 
defined as ‘the total of the consequences of the scenario-incident’ which, aside from 
being immeasurable (and opaque), restricts the discussion of risk to the various 
scenarios defined and described by the experts and authors in the first place. 
 
What’s more, as a later version of this document also advised, a scenario is held to 
be ‘a description of’ a number of elements including ‘the (underlying) cause of an 
                                                          
23 See, in particular, the work of Slovic on the first two of these. 
24 See, for instance, Goerlandt et al. (2017). 
25 The expansion of ‘child safety’ is just one example of this. See Appleton (2006), as well as 
Furedi and Bristow (2008). 
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incident’ (RIVM 2009, p.17). But how could the analysts determine a priori what the 
(underlying) causes of an incident were? Presumably these are open to 
interpretation, or indeed contestation? What if the experts failed to envisage a key 
factor? Instead, the causes are smuggled in as facts – as part of the scenario – 
which, lest we forget, is held here to drive the strategic planning (through the risk 
assessment), rather than deriving from it. 
 
2.2.3. Who decides? 
 
If risks (and so – according to the presentation in such documents – strategy) come 
to be attributed to a combination of expectations or forecasts within ascribed 
scenarios, the outcomes would seem to be written-in from the outset (or, at least, the 
alternatives not considered). Such a methodology is significantly subjective in 
character as whoever makes the case and variable selection determines everything.  
 
But the authors and experts behind these reports are understandably uncomfortable 
to reveal quite how much of a supposedly objective methodology is chosen by them. 
Accordingly – whether they are conscious of it or not – this then becomes obfuscated 
by terminology and numbers. 
 
Aside from developing scenarios held to impact the ‘vital interests’ of Dutch society 
(MIBZK 2008, p.8 and MVJ 2014, p.9), irrespective of whether these have been 
openly interrogated, they are then dissimulated by being ‘translated into one or more’ 
of ‘ten chosen impact criteria’ (2014, p.19), which are then scored and aggregated. 
The process of aggregation is not discussed, but at least one of the early versions of 
these documents was honest enough to point to the ‘high level of subjectivity’ (RIVM 
2009, p.26) involved, explaining further that: 
 
‘the ten individual impact scores are merged using an aggregation procedure into 
an overall impact score; this is done in a number of ways which differ from each 
other in the method of weighting the importance of the criteria and the labels’ 
(2009, p.30) 
 
Of course, risk analysis is not conducted in a vacuum either. Accordingly, attempts 
are usually made to separate the abstract assessment of risk – conducted by 
technical experts – from those individuals and institutions more directly accountable 
to the public who are charged with managing the risk based on the advice they 
receive. This is to avoid conflicts of interest – like ‘sexed-up’ dossiers – when officials 
are asked to revise their assessments to make them more politically appealing to the 
electorate.26 As Veland et al. note: 
 
‘The distinction between assessment and values is an issue that has been 
broadly discussed in the risk literature, and many authors argue that value 
deliberations belong to the decision-making sphere, and should not be part of a 
risk assessment’ (2013, p.354) 
 
                                                          
26 The phrase ‘sexed-up’ in this context has come to be associated with the 2002 intelligence 
document ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British 
Government’, which is widely recognised as having allowed intended outcomes to shape the 
analysis. 
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Ultimately, decisions need not concur with the assessment and advice of experts. 
Warnings can be ignored and equally it is possible for problem-free prognoses to be 
overruled on precautionary grounds to appease presumed concerns. This is because 
the degree of risk people are prepared to accept is held to be socially or culturally 
determined and it is still assumed, for now, that this is best reflected through the 
views of their elected representatives rather than those of appointed officials. 
 
However, the extent to which such representatives are willing to wade through the 
sheer volume of detail and confusing cacophony of different weightings provided in 
such documents, let-alone follow the meaning of convoluted phrases such as; ‘the 
scenarios are compression points in the continuum of variations and possibilities’ 
(RIVM 2009, p.18) is a moot point and a potential stumbling block. 
 
Nor is risk analysis pursued without purpose. Whilst it is presented as being a 
description of things as they are, it invariably serves to point to a prescription of what 
ought to be. In the language of social science it is both positive (evidence-based) 
and normative (policy-oriented). Impacts just are – but to label these good or bad 
depends on one’s perspective and is a moral (individual) or political (collective) 
determination. Risk assessments and risk management may be conducted with the 
best of intentions – as decisions have to be made over what problems to prioritise 
and how to allocate resources – but they can also serve to conceal the value 
judgments behind these.27 
 
Nevertheless, having elaborated quite how much of this supposedly objective 
process serves to combine and conceal assumptions, interests and ignorance, the 
emphasis throughout these documents is that it is for the Cabinet (within the Dutch 
government) to determine or decide (MIBZK 2008, RIVM 2009, MVJ 2014).  
 
But nothing could be further from the truth. Having devised scenarios and adjusted 
weightings to reflect their world view, it is quite clear that whoever drafts these 
documents is under no illusion as to what and how the Cabinet should choose. 
Indeed, as time has moved on so increasingly the element of choice in these 
documents has shifted from politicians to experts. For the former not to follow the 
recommendations given by the latter would be considered tantamount to their wilfully 
ignoring the assumed facts.28 
 
Of course, not really being able to choose – or having one’s hand forced – may 
benefit a Cabinet reluctant to make key moral or political decisions. It is always 
easier to hide behind a set of numbers arrived at through an obscure or obtuse 
methodology and to say ‘I had no choice, the figures dictated my course of action’, 
than it is to argue with, inspire and engage the public as to why particular decisions 
                                                          
27 For instance, most people would apply moral persuasion rather than seek to appeal to the 
wealth of academic literature pertaining to the purported risks of secondary tobacco 
inhalation in order to deter someone from lighting-up a cigarette in their home. Presenting 
matters as a risk then becomes a means to avoid engagement and deliberation. 
28 This also explains why so many were indignant at the outcome of the Brexit vote in the 
UK. They felt that the public (and some politicians) had ignored the ‘truths’ presented by 
experts (which rather patronisingly presumes the public to be unable to see through the 
implied ‘lies’ as experts do). 
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ought to be taken and supported.29 (The latter would further benefit from having 
people act as active advocates rather than unwitting recipients). 
 
This may suit everybody’s agenda – experts and politicians alike – bar the public. 
The experts get to design the methodology, determine the scenarios and draw-up 
the recommendations to facilitate the Cabinet decision, safe in the view that these 
ought to be accepted. In effect, a set of unelected, unrepresentative and 
unaccountable bureaucrats become the judge, jury and executioner of national 
strategy.  
 
This serves those who have lost faith in the direction of the nominally elected 
representatives of society, or who fantasise about being in power themselves. It 
absolves those representatives of the need for difficult argument and the 
complications of engaging the public. But it is also a travesty – not just of democracy 
– but of reasoned decision-making. It can store up greater problems further afield, 
not least in accelerating the creation of an alienated public (or one sensing itself to 
be vulnerable and powerless) who, in their turn, could become one of the challenges 
officials may yet have to consider. 
 
2.2.4. Worst-case scenarios 
 
There is nothing inherently wrong with planning, but to prepare for the worst can go 
beyond planning and into actions that themselves have an impact (not least in 
deflecting attention from other challenges and diverting resources accordingly). 
Presumably this is what is implied when we read that: 
 
‘The National Risk Assessment is not concerned with what will happen in the 
future, but with the question as to all that could happen in the unforeseeable 
future and, in such events, which capabilities may be required’. (MVJ 2014, p.9) 
 
Earlier versions of this spoke of the need for scenarios to encompass ‘the most 
serious imaginable’ impacts (RIVM 2009, p.18).  
 
The problem is that it is possible to imagine a bit too much. There is a vast slippage 
in the world of counterterrorism for instance between intent and capability, or 
between possibility and probability (Furedi, 2009). Much of what passes for intent 
nowadays could be labelled sheer fantasy, with those concerned displaying little 
capability of doing anything about their ideas. Indeed, the fact that almost all terrorist 
incidents in the world involve conventional weaponry (and non-weapons such as 
vehicles), rather than the exotic technologies many concern themselves with, should 
alert security analysts to the dangers of this kind of speculative scenario planning. 
 
Similarly, despite subsequent protestations to the contrary, the worldwide public 
health response to 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza was also based on worst-case 
scenario planning. The Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
Margaret Chan announced this as being ‘all of humanity that is under threat’ (WHO 
2009), prior to her and her staff having to calm matters down by noting that most 
cases were mild and there was no need to restrict travel or trade. But pandemic 
                                                          
29 Others apply a similar reasoning to much of the rationale behind the workings of the 
European Union, as well as its concomitant problems (Bickerton, 2012; Heartfield, 2013). 
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preparedness had consistently been promoted by the WHO well beforehand and this 
emphasis, in its turn, fed off a culture increasingly oriented towards precaution, 
prevention and pre-emption (Richter et al., 2006). 
 
This broader trend has helped drive the shift from probabilistic risk assessment to 
possibilistic speculation about uncertainty in every arena. But in an emergency, 
information only forms one element of the considerations entered into by the public. 
Concerns by the authorities over the need to provide the latest, most accurate 
details, through the most effective channels, miss the wider context entirely. Indeed, 
there may be a surfeit of information at such times. What matters most is the 
interpretation of its meaning according to previously determined frameworks that 
have, by then, evolved across protracted periods (Durodié, 2011). 
 
Worst-cases very rarely happen. Rather, it becomes the pre-emptive actions of those 
anticipating these – often through the prism of their own insecurities more than any 
objective evidence – that can alter situations. Triangulating available options with the 
most-likely scenario would probably be more useful for planning purposes. It may be 
preferable too not to speculate wildly about what you do not know, or worse, to start 
acting as if this were true. 
 
In relation to H1N1, despite UK ministers and officials having been advised at an 
early stage ‘that modelling capability would be low due to the lack of available data’, 
a team ‘was asked to produce forecasts’ on a frequent basis regardless (Cabinet 
Office 2010, pp.66-67). The official inquiry into this episode led by Dame Deirdre 
Hine later concluded that ‘ministers and officials set a great deal of store by 
modelling’ as it ‘provides easily understandable figures’ that ‘because of its 
mathematical and academic nature may seem scientifically very robust’ (ibid). In 
other words, models provide an aura of knowing what is happening and what might 
ensue. This establishes authority and enables actions to be taken. 
 
For the UK, the official inquiry estimated the episode to have cost about £1.2billion 
(or just under $2billion), including expenditure on drugs, vaccines, helplines and 
other health-related costs (many of which were subsequently assessed to have been 
next to useless – or worse).30 In addition, a study published in the British Medical 
Journal proposed that this took no account of any broader ramifications including the 
opportunity costs of redirecting resources away from other health services, or factors 
such as absenteeism resulting from exaggerated fears, and workplace closures 
estimated to impact GDP between six and sixty times as much as the official 
estimate (Smith et al. 2009). 
 
If true, that would represent more damage than that inflicted on the British economy 
over the course of the global market crash of 2008. For the French government the 
cost of vaccines led to intense criticism as they sought to cancel orders and offload 
their hastily acquired stockpile on to others (Bradley, 2010). But, above all, it was 
trust in the authorities that was lost over the course of this episode – a commodity 
most recognise as being hard to regain.  
                                                          
30 See, for instance, the Cochrane Review (2014) and the related British Medical Journal 
website (http://www.bmj.com/tamiflu), while also noting challenges to these (McVernon, 
2015). 
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Far from benefiting from hindsight, the existence of broader cultural insecurities and 
confusions that encourage a proclivity to imagine the worst are very clear in 
advance. It is these that now drive risk analysis and that can come to undermine 
trust in risk management. 
 
3. Communication and Theory 
 
3.1 Risk Communication 
 
The communication of risk is an essential element of strategic management. As 
noted above, it is most effective in societies that share common aims and values, 
and hence a common framework for articulating risk. A good crisis response system 
emerges as an agreed social objective, rather than being dissimulated and operated 
from above. 
 
Risk communication becomes particularly fraught however in the context of 
incomplete intelligence regarding prospective, rather than actual, threats (Freedman, 
2005). Such situations can expose the extent of passive tolerance of – rather than 
active support for – the authorities. 
 
Lack of information about particular problems can encourage certain agencies to fill 
the gap with predictions instead. These, almost inevitably nowadays, place a greater 
emphasis on vulnerabilities, as they appear easier to assess and hence regulate. But 
a heightened sense of vulnerability can encourage insecurity too, thereby 
undermining public morale. 
 
Anticipation is, of course, an important conceptual tool and can, in specific 
circumstances, serve as a useful exercise. But, as we have seen, by promoting 
worst-case scenarios it is also possible to imagine and impose rather too much. It is 
one thing to imagine what might happen, quite another to act as if this were already 
true. 
 
Reorganizing service provision and focusing public communication around 
presumptions can be very damaging, both in terms of resource allocation from more 
evident pressing needs, and by alienating those with alternative analyses or 
conflicting interpretations. 
 
Risk communication usually conveys a sense of likelihood. But in situations where a 
probability cannot be ascertained – as is frequently the case – planners ought to 
become concerned that their incomplete assessments may result in imperfect 
messages being communicated to the public, with associated problems of credibility. 
 
This is often described as the need to strike a balance between being complacent on 
the one hand and encouraging undue anxieties on the other. It is assumed that 
governments who say nothing when aware of possible threats will be accused, 
should one materialize, of having failed in their duty. Those that warn regularly when 
little happens might be labelled as alarmist. 
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So, for instance, as Freedman notes (2005), various governments were chastised for 
not having provided adequate information to travellers as to the possibility of bomb 
attacks in Bali prior to October 2002. These were then criticized again for the 
guidance they produced thereafter, which was perceived by some as overstated and 
potentially damaging to various regional economies. 
 
Information provision is inevitably understood, either explicitly or implicitly by both 
communicators and recipients, as being in part at least, a transfer of responsibility 
and accountability. This may not be welcomed by the recipients, especially if they 
have had little say in the framing of the messages. In addition, if the details provided 
are neither specific, nor useful in terms of the possibility they offer of being able to 
alter particular courses of action or to promote others, then they can only come 
across as futile exhortations or mantras. 
 
Communication about terrorism, for instance, presents a particular problem as it is 
usually poor in quality but also necessarily provides information and signals to the 
potential perpetrator. Unlike advice about natural hazards, warnings about an 
imminent attack allow detractors to alter the threat they pose. 
 
Indeed, these may choose not to proceed, in order purposefully to undermine trust in 
the authorities. But while the authorities may worry about this unduly at the time, as 
we have seen real trust is established well in advance of any emergency on the 
basis not just of handling previous crises, but also through having established a 
broader sense of social purpose, direction and identification. 
 
In fact, the focus on information and on what to communicate – or not communicate 
– is the real problem. In an emergency, people are usually bombarded with a surfeit 
of facts and pseudo-facts. What they need to know is what the meaning of the 
events is. It is the interpretation, or the framing, of the situation that matters most. 
 
Rather than painstakingly attempting to measure, grade and communicate threat 
levels, effective tactical warnings derive from good strategic analysis that allows 
people to contextualize events. Accordingly, projecting a sense of social purpose is 
far more important than highlighting vulnerabilities, or even focusing on the technical 
competence to deal with emergencies. To only address the latter shifts the focus 
from positive intent and direction to a shallow responsiveness to events that 
highlights uncertainty. 
 
Of course, there is a constant competition within and outside of government as to the 
correct interpretation of contemporary circumstances. This is both necessary and 
healthy. It challenges the leadership to establish a coherent position. This outlook 
must then be articulated and inculcated throughout government to avoid clashes 
between its different branches. 
 
More problematically though, it has already been noted that certain factions both 
inside and beyond the state apparatus, may develop a personal stake in particular 
approaches or interpretations. These then, either through the pursuit of private profit 
or for moral authority, seek only to highlight those elements of information that 
appear to add weight to their preferred frameworks. 
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Cultural authority derives from the resolution of a clash of meanings or 
interpretations, within which the official line forms only one voice. It competes for 
attention with other sources within the establishment, including the media. Whilst 
terrorism itself is sometimes construed as a form of communication, more often than 
not nowadays, it is various commentators who project their own interpretation as to 
the meaning of these events into the vacuum left behind by the perpetrators 
(Durodié, 2013). 
 
Communication certainly depends on having the means to reach an audience, but 
more importantly it is dependent on having the ability to convince them. This requires 
both that the message have some coherent and purposeful content, and also that 
the various parties share a framework of meaning.  
 
In addition, those involved in strategic communications must be able to decode 
language and understand that social responses are not always triggered by the 
matters most immediately at hand. 
 
For instance, when the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the US 
Ambassador, W. Nathaniel Howell, was asked by the occupying forces to inform 
American nationals that they should report to a particular hotel in order to be 
afforded protection. Concerned that his fellow citizens might be turned into human 
shields, the Ambassador issued an advisory to the effect that those who believed 
they would be safer under Iraqi protection could do as he had been advised 
(Culbertson and Howell, 2001). 
 
He believed – correctly – that most Americans would read between the lines and see 
through this message. The Iraqis however, believing their instructions had been 
adhered to, waited by the assembly point whilst American embassy cars hastily 
extracted their people from where they had been staying and took them to safety. 
 
Such a level of comprehension and the ability to use language as a code is largely 
dependent upon the gradual and long-term establishment of trust between various 
parties – well in advance of any emergency. This relationship develops through 
identification in shared values that have little to do with the specifics of any particular 
situation. 
 
Blunt and repeated messages that offer little opportunity for dialogue or engagement 
are often ignored. They come to form part of a background cacophony of sounds and 
images, which people interpret, not as warnings or advice, but as self-serving social 
policy statements (or virtue signalling) by those who communicate them (often public 
authorities perceived of as being increasingly remote and unaccountable). 
 
Ironically then, authorities that make a point of regularly communicating to the public 
on their emergency readiness and the need for public vigilance, implicitly, if 
unconsciously, transmit a message that can come to emphasize the very opposite. 
Far from building up social resilience, which requires protracted engagement with, 
and support for, positive social goals, this vulnerability-led approach conveys a 
narrow, operational frame that people find uninspiring and can be repulsed by. 
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Of course, not all individuals react in a similar way. How people respond in adverse 
situations – aside from any immediate need they have to act – is shaped through the 
prism of how they already understand their relationship with the authorities to be, as 
well as the wider cultural mood. Those who believe government always has their 
best interests at heart, act accordingly – and so do those who do not. 
 
Complaints that emerge at such times should not always be interpreted as being 
directly related. Excessive efforts to counteract these, framed in terms of the 
immediate problem can be pointless or counter-productive. Rather, it is important to 
identify the wider, often unstated issues that concerns allude to and speak in a 
language that addresses these. 
 
Most members of the public also understand that it is impossible for the authorities to 
predict all things with complete accuracy, or to preclude all adversity. Whilst they 
expect government and its agencies to take reasonable measures to protect 
individuals and institutions, they rarely want to see society paralyzed through fear of 
infrequent or marginal events. Nor ought we to wish to see operational 
preoccupations driving out the need for more strategic and broader human 
considerations at every turn. 
 
In this vein, at the height of the Cold War in 1969 and in the light of the then 
spiralling cost of pursuing sub-atomic research, the founding director of Fermilab, 
Robert Rathbun Wilson, was called to testify before a US Congressional Committee 
and to account for the work of, what was at the time, the world’s most significant 
particle accelerator.  
 
Some of the assembled Congressmen wanted to know what the overall contribution 
of high-energy physics would be to securing the nation’s defence (or, as they might 
put it today – addressing security risks and making the US safer).  
 
Wilson advised: 
 
‘It has nothing to do directly with defending our country, except to make it worth 
defending’.31 
 
3.2 Framing 
 
As noted above, the interpretation of evidence can, in certain instances, come to 
matter more than supposed facts themselves. This may come as a surprise to those 
who value normative outlooks less than empirical data (and even more so, so-called 
‘Big Data’).32 But in many instances it is the former that directs action rather than the 
latter. 
 
For example, the absence of evidence for the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq ahead of the 2003 conflict there, appears to have carried little 
sway among the key decision-makers (who had planned for an invasion in advance 
of looking for the evidence anyway). For them, it would seem, the deposing of 
                                                          
31 Cited at: http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/18/us/robert-r-wilson-physicist-who-led-
fermilab-dies-at-85.html 
32 So-called, in light of the analysis provided by Harkness (2016). 
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Saddam Hussein was more important. That he was perceived of as being 
untrustworthy may have further explained in their minds why weapons inspectors 
were unable to discover any firm proof in the intervening months.33 
 
That intelligence encompasses both information as well as how it is interpreted is 
well understood in security circles, though the tendency remains when speaking of 
‘intelligence failures’ to look back for missing information, to claim to have received 
false or misleading information, or simply to appeal to the existence of a surfeit of 
information to process. Cases where intelligence analysts examine and question 
their assumptions and frameworks are less frequent. 
 
Nevertheless, interpretative prisms shape how individuals and institutions will 
respond to events and challenges well in advance of any specific manifestation of 
any of those occurring. Such outlooks and behaviours are gradually formed through 
the influence of factors that, as we have seen, may have little to do with any 
immediate problem or cause. These can include our sense of confidence, optimism, 
purpose or trust (in ourselves as well as others), as well as wider cultural norms and 
expectations. 
 
How people act or respond to any particular situation is, accordingly, a product of the 
legacy of past events, experiences and expectations, as well as of current 
assumptions and evidence. Real social leadership is to be achieved by shaping 
these values and outlooks well in advance of any particular problem emerging. 
Equally, risk communication does not take place in a vacuum. Those engaging in it 
need to be acutely attuned to the cultural mood that they project their messages into.  
 
That risk analysis and risk management cannot address, let-alone solve, every social 
ill ought also to be a key lesson for those working in this milieu. To read the 
academic literature and public health commentary relating to the problems of 
excessive alcohol consumption, for example, one might be forgiven for thinking 
otherwise. People drink such beverages for a variety of reasons – but few, if any, do 
so to benefit their health. Why risk-based health warnings would be imagined to have 
much of an effect on their behaviour is therefore questionable. 
 
Drinking alcohol is usually engaged in as part of a socialisation process with others. 
Alternatively – when taken to excess – it may signal the breakdown of social 
connections and personal meaning. Risk management therefore has little to say 
about the real reasons for partaking in either moderate, occasionally excessive or 
ultimately destructive quantities.  
 
It is certainly true that alcohol is damaging in many ways (though some assumptions 
regarding this in the present may be distorted through the twin prisms of greater 
awareness and increased public unacceptability) but most who successfully curb 
their problematic behaviours do so not through enhanced risk awareness but rather 
                                                          
33 Appealing for pre-emptive intervention almost 6 months ahead of the war, President 
George W. Bush argued that: ‘we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that 
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’ (The Guardian, 2002). 
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by encountering something that imbues their life with a renewed meaning and 
purpose.34 
 
In this sense presenting the matter in the language of risk appears as the equivalent 
of knowing the cost of everything and the value of nothing. As the former British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, noted in a newspaper column responding to the episodes 
of rioting that occurred across many cities in England in the summer of 2011: 
 
‘[W]e are in danger of the wrong analysis leading to the wrong diagnosis, leading 
to the wrong prescription’. 
 
And while, as noted elsewhere (Durodié, 2011), his own interpretation of these 
events may also have been erroneous, at least he appears to have understood there 
to be what some sociologists might call a competition or ‘search for meaning’ in the 
aftermath of such incidents (Furedi, 2015; Durodié, 2013), rather than a clear-cut, 
risk-based analysis and solution based on the evidence. 
 
4. Concluding thoughts 
 
Much contemporary risk analysis and management revolves around the themes of 
health and safety. In part, this may be because in some way these best capture the 
increasingly atomised nature of contemporary society. They reflect an individuated 
focus on existential security that emerged in the aftermath of the ending of the mass 
political engagement of the last century. 
 
From the discussion above we can discern some key elements: 
 
1. Risk analysis and management have migrated from being primarily technical 
arenas to touch increasingly on social, cultural and political affairs. 
 
2. The complex tools designed for these can conceal the moral values and political 
persuasions that lie behind them and thereby undermine trust. 
 
3. Emphasising worst-cases rather than most likely scenarios and highlighting 
possibilities over probabilities may further alienate the public. 
 
4. Modelling experts need to be conscious of the cultural basis for their selection of 
risks and the vagaries of interpreting the meaning of their data. 
 
5. Trust is best maintained by inspiring and engaging the intended audience rather 
than exhorting them to act in accordance with assumed concerns. 
 
It is precisely because the conceptualisation of risk is embedded within a network of 
contestable cultural priorities and presumptions that risk managers cannot avoid or 
bypass the need to engage the public in a wider discussion regarding the values 
implicit within their equations and models. Presumptions of objectivity necessarily 
                                                          
34 See the talk given by the GP, Dr Michael Fitzpatrick on this at the debate ‘Boozy Britain: A 
Nation of Binge Drinkers?’, part of the Battle of Ideas Festival and available at Section 4 of: 
http://library.fora.tv/2008/11/02/Boozy_Britain_A_Nation_of_Binge_Drinkers  
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lead to a disconnection between theory and practice as the purpose of risk 
communication is then simply assumed rather than agreed on. 
 
The ‘Risk Society’ was originally framed by radicals around concerns pertaining to 
the impact of environmental damage (Beck, 1986), while more recently, in the 
aftermath of 9/11, more conservative social actors bought into the ‘Culture of Fear’ it 
encouraged through the prism of counterterrorism (Furedi, 2002). Accordingly, it has 
become the dominant outlook of almost all significant social actors. In some ways it 
has become an organising framework for an age devoid of other principles around 
which to cohere. 
 
Process and pragmatism now appear to determine everything. But these can simply 
provide a smokescreen of numbers that conceal the implicit (and occasionally 
explicit) outlooks and values that lie behind them. They allow decisions to be made 
that effectively bypass broader engagement. 
 
Theorising about anything inevitably opens up the door to the possibility of being 
found wanting in the face of so-called ‘hard’ evidence. But theories themselves – as 
attempts to find order in the world – are an analysis, or interpretation, that emerge 
from and are mediated by, experience. The attempt to then apply these, through 
policy and practice, also requires clarity of purpose.  
 
Accordingly, when outcomes fail to match intentions, it may be due either to our 
misinterpreting events and evidence, or our having unclear aims in the first place. 
Both of these necessitate as a prerequisite having a finely attuned understanding not 
just of technical matters, but of cultural circumstances and drivers. Clear values – 
both moral and political – may come to matter more to validating and trusting risk 
analysis and management than anything else. 
 
In focusing on these we will also, inevitably, have to engage much more with those 
often on the receiving end of well-meaning (though occasionally misguided) risk 
management. We have seen in recent times a turn against the tyranny of so-called 
elites and their experts (Hume, 2017). It is high-time, if these hope to be trusted, for 
them to try to bridge the gap between themselves and the public at large. 
 
As the great Enlightenment humanist, John Stuart Mill, noted in the concluding 
passage of his classic work ‘On Liberty’ (1859): 
 
‘a State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments 
in its hands, even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great 
thing can really be accomplished. 
 
For risk analysis to be valid and risk management to be trusted those articulating 
these need to stop talking to those they purport to serve and start instead to work 
with them. 
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